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Post-Service Earnings of Veterans:
Evidence From the Reserves
I. INTRODUCTION
The population of veterans in the U.S. in 1986 was estimated to be 27.6 million (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1989). This stock is augmented every year by approximately 300,000
enlisted members of the armed forces who leave active duty and reenter civilian life, most
after serving only one tour of duty. Although numerous previous studies have analyzed the
civilian labor market experiences of veterans, most have concentrated on cohorts from
conscription periods, especially the Vietnam War. In contrast, although the All-Volunteer
Force (AVF) era began nearly two decades ago in 1973, research on the experiences of
veterans from this era has been limited. The impact of military service on today's self-
selected volunteers may be entirely different from the effects observed for the drafted or
draft-motivated veterans of earlier eras.
Empirical results from the handful of recent studies of volunteers have produced
inconsistent conclusions, despite the fact that the studies have relied almost exclusively on
a single data source -- the National Longitudinal Survey, Youth Cohort (NLS). Because of
the importance of the policy issues associated with the transition of youth from school to the
military or to the civilian work force, it is crucial that alternative data sets be explored. In
this regard, Richard Freeman's comments concerning empirical research in labor economics
are especially appropriate:
"... any 'finding' ought to be replicated on several data
sets and under alternative 'plausible' model specifications
before one accepts it as valid ... In economics, it is the
cumulation of disparate lines of evidence . . . that is
compelling." (1989, p. x)
The present study examines one such alternative data source -- the Department of
Defense's 1986 Reserve Components Survey (Research Triangle Institute, 1987) -- in an
effort to identify the effect of a tour of military duty on post-service earnings. The data
refer to male reservists, rather than a random sample of the population. However, the
numerous advantages associated with the sample, including a partial control for the self-
selection bias associated with military enlistment, should make it possible to extrapolate the
results of the study to the population at large. The Reserve Components Survey provides
extensive information on individual military background, and permits an examination of
several hypothesized effects of military service that have appeared in the prior Iksrature,
but that have not been extensively investigated for AVF veterans.
I. BACKGROUND
Although empirical research on veterans from pre-AVF eras is extensive, it has failed
to produce a consensus concerning the post-service earnings effect of military service. 1
Given the sparse literature on AVF-era veterans, it is not surprising a consensus also has
failed to emerge for current veterans. Bryant and Wilhite (1990) decomposed veterans'
military backgrounds into several components: time spent in the military, time spent in
'See Mangum and Ball (1989) for a brief survey of the literature.
formal training, occupational specialty, and branch of service. On the basis of interaction
terms for branch and length of service and for branch and training time, time spent in the
Army, Marine Corps, and Navy displayed negative effects on civilian earnings. On the other
hand, formal training received in the Navy and Air Force was positively correlated with
civilian earnings.
Despite several innovations in the Bryant-Wilhite study, several questions can be
raised about their approach. For example, the authors are silent on the definition of the
variable used to measure time spent in military training. Because the mean value of the
training variable is very low (1.78 months), it is not clear whether the variable relects all
training time, including basic training, or advanced training only. No matter what the intent
was in creating this variable, it probably understates the actual level of advanced training.2
Also, the amount of time spent in training should have been deducted from the military
tenure variable in order to estimate the effect of military tenure net of time spent in
training.
Mangum and Ball (1987) compared the probability of skill transfer for individuals
with military training versus those with civilian training. The authors found that nearly one-
half of those who received military training transferred their skills to a civilian job, and that
the probability of transfer tended to be greater for more technical military occupational
specialties (MOS). In a second study (1989), the same authors examined the civilian wage
2
ln the Army, all enlistees, even those in the infantry, receive advanced training. In the other branches,
only some members receive advanced training, but their training period can be lengthy.
effects of skill transfer, type and provider of training, and veteran status. Even though they
confirmed that earnings were higher when military-acquired skills were transferred to
civilian jobs, their overall results were mixed and in some cases counterintuitive. For
example, they found no significant wage effects from civilian apprenticeship and employer-
provided training programs, even though such training has a very high transfer rate. A
second surprising finding was that measures of veteran status were seldom statistically
significant.
Andrisani and Daymont (1986) used two different NLS surveys -- the Youth and the
Young Men cohorts - to distinguish the short- from the long-run effects of military service.
Earnings profiles were estimated for veterans and nonveterans based on the time elapsed
since leaving high school and since discharge from the military. They concluded that
veterans experience a significant earnings drop in the year they exit the military, but have
higher earnings growth rates than nonveterans and overtake their peers two-to-three years
after discharge. Unfortunately, the estimated coefficients on which their conclusions were
based often were not statistically significant.
These studies have improved our understanding of the linkages between the military
background of AVF veterans and their post-service earnings. However, several unresolved
issues remain. One issue is associated with the use of the NLS by all of the studies reviewed
above. The small samples of veterans in the NLS have made it difficult to adequately
decompose each person's military background. 3 A second problem is that the sample of
veterans in the NLS is still relatively young; often, they have not been in the civilian labor
force long enough to have completed valuable human capital investments -- such as further
education or migration - that would enable them to catch up to their nonveteran
counterparts. Other surveys with large samples of veterans (the Current Population Survey
or the decennial census) suffer from a lack of information on military background. To
counter these problems, the present study provides results from a survey that combines the
advantages of a large sample of veterans with information on each respondent's prior
military history.4
III. DATA AND SAMPLE
The 1986 Reserve Components Survey (RCS) sampled 60,120 members of the
selected reserve. 5 Reservists are "citizen-soldiers," who, for training purposes, normally drill
one weekend per month and two weeks during the summer. The vast majority of reservists
hold full-time civilian jobs: they are essentially civilians with a part-time military affiliation.
What makes the RCS especially attractive for the purposes of the present study is that
respondents were divided between those who had served on active duty prior to entering the
reserves (and returning to civilian life), and those who had not; that is, some reservists are
3 Due to small samples, Bryant and Wilhite were unable to estimate the wage effect of the interaction
between branch of service and MOS due to the large number of cells with zero observations (p. 79).
4The methodology used by Goldberg and Warner (1987) of matching veterans with Social Security
Administration earnings information has not been applied to AVF veterans. Although their approach yields
a large sample of veterans, only grouped earnings data can be used.
5 The membership of the selected reserve components in 1986 numbered 1.1 million. (Department of
Defense, 1989).
veterans, and some are not. In addition to providing a large sample of veterans with
reported civilian earnings, the RCS also clearly identifies officers and enlisted personnel.
Some previous studies have inadvertently combined officer and enlisted personnel,6 even
though the two groups are likely to display vastly different post-service earnings patterns.
Similarly, the RCS does not mix draftees (or draft-motivated individuals) and true
volunteers, which also may have biased many draft-era studies.
Selection bias has been addressed directly in only a handful of prior studies.7 Self-
selection occurs because enlistees have chosen the military over other alternatives; in
addition, veterans represent enlistees who have chosen to leave the military at the expiration
of their term of service. Both of these choices may hinge on unobserved characteristics.
Censoring also occurs because veterans must meet stringent physical and mental standards
to be admitted to the military or to be eligible for reenlistment. If the factors that explain
why some individuals become veterans - i.e., the enlistment and reenlistment decisions --
are also correlated with earnings, then self-selection may bias estimates of veteran status on
civilian post-service earnings.
The sample of reservists from the RCS provides a partial control for the
heterogeneity that can bias earnings studies. First, since entrance standards for the reserve
9Studies using individual data from the decennial census (e.g., Berger and Hirsch, 1983; 1985) or the
Current Population Survey have no way of distinguishing between veterans who were officers and those who
were enlisted because information on rank is not available in the data.
7
See, for example, Angrist (1989; 1990) and Trost and Warner (1979).
6
and active components are essentially the same, both the veterans and nonveterans in the
sample are qualified for active military duty; that is, the sample of reservists eliminates non-
randomness arising from the application of military entrance standards to the youth
population. 8 A second source of selection bias is addressed because all survey respondents
have a positive taste for military service; some have exercised it by joining the reserves,
others by originally serving on active duty. Thus, to some extent the sample controls for
unobserved taste differences between veterans and nonveterans that may have clouded the
interpretation of previous studies.9
An opposite concern can be raised that the homogeneity of the sample of reservists
introduces other biases that might blur differences between veterans and nonveterans. The
basis for this concern is that all reservists receive the same basic training regardless of
whether they originally enlist for active duty or for the reserves. Furthermore, many Army
enlistees (both active and reserve) receive the same advanced individual training.
Nonetheless, these similarities are unlikely to bias the proposed comparisons of reservist-
8 Aggregate data for this period indicate that the distribution of scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying
Test (AFQT) reservist-veterans were the same as those for reservist-nonveterans (Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense, 1987).
9Note that self-selection is only partially controlled because, despite having similar tastes for the military,
some differences remain: "reservist-veterans" accepted a full-time military life style, whereas "reservist-
nonveterans" chose a part-time military association that involved less disruption to their normal civilian
lifestyle. Indeed, economists have often treated serving in the reserves as simply a form of moonlighting
(Mehay, 1991). Thus, some taste differences remain unaccounted for. Although selection problems may
remain, the necessary data to apply a standard selectivity adjustment technique are not available in the RCS.
Specifically, very little information is available on respondents' characteristics when they entered active duty,
thus we cannot predict veteran status other than by the use of current characteristics. In addition, we have
no information that would allow us to predict why some individuals remained on active duty and others
chose to leave.
veterans and reservist-nonveterans. After only two, or at most four, months of training on
active duty, reservists return to their home communities and civilian jobs, while active duty
members deploy on operational, often overseas, tours. Also, active duty members work full-
time at their occupational specialties and receive extensive on-the-job, as well as additional
formal training. In contrast, reservists receive only a limited amount of training time each
year, roughly one-tenth what the regular armed forces receive. Even after several years of
service, reservists often still are not fully qualified in their occupational specialties (GAO,
1988).
Thus, although differences between reservist-veterans and reservist-nonveterans are
not as sharp as those between veterans and nonveterans in the civilian (non-reserve)
population, the remaining differences should permit a clear test of the impact of a tour of
active military duty. The factors that civilian employers are likely to perceive and evaluate
are all a function of service on active dutv, not in the reserves. These factors include the
lengthy absence from the civilian work force, receipt of formal and on-the-job technical
training, receipt of general work skills, and satisfactory completion of one's contracted
military enlistment period.
Several restrictions were imposed on the original sample of reservists: women were
omitted due to demand constraints on their enlistment in both the active and reserve
components. Respondents who were Coast Guard reservists, officers, full-time students,
currently unemployed, or working part-time also were deleted. To ensure that individuals
were compared at similar points in their civilian careers, reservist-veterans were restricted
to those with six years or less of active duty. This restriction allows us to test the impact of
military service for the vast majority of volunteers who leave the military after one tour, or
at most two tours, of active duty. To minimize coding or response errors in the earnings
variable, we made use of the fact that the RCS reports two different earnings measures --
annual income and weekly earnings. Observations showing a gross inconsistency between
these two measures were eliminated, as were observations with missing or implausible values
for any of the variables used in the analysis. These restrictions resulted in a usable sample
of 23,484 observations, of whom 44.6 percent were veterans.
The approach used involves estimating standard Mincer-type earnings functions.
Variables that capture general human capital include years of education (EDUC), potential
work force experience (EXP), and potential experience squared (EXP2). Because the RCS
provided no information on tenure in the current job we were unable to include a firm-
specific human capital variable. Current labor force status was reflected in dummy variables
for self-employment (SELF), and for occupation and industry of employment (using one-
digit census codes). Finally, as is typical in human capital studies, demographic variables
representing race (NONWHITE=l), marital status (MARRIED = 1), and number of
children (CHILD) were also included in the specification. 10 Descriptions and means of the
variables used in the earnings models are shown in Table 1.
10One important measure often used to control for ability differences is the individuals score on the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT); unfortunately, AFQT scores were not collected in the RCS.
Table 1 indicates that the mean weekly earnings and annual income of veterans
surpassed that of nonveterans by rather sizeable amounts: 13.3 percent and 16.2 percent,
respectively. This difference confirms what has been found in other tabulations of income
by veteran status (VA, 1984). However, these differences virtually disappear below in the
estimated regression models that control for the differences in the characteristics of the two
groups: namely, veterans are somewhat older, have more labor market experience and
education, and are more likely to be married than nonveterans.
One unique aspect of the RCS is that 46 percent of the veterans served in the Army.
This percentage exceeds the fraction of the active force -- 36 percent in 1986 -- serving in
the U.S. Army (U.S. Census Bureau, 1989) and, therefore, likely exceeds the proportion of
Army veterans in the population. 11 The high percentage of Army veterans in the RCS is
due to the disproportionate distribution of reserve units (and manpower) to the two Army
reserve components, the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, which in 1986 accounted
for two-thirds of total selected reserve manpower (Department of Defense, 1989).n
11 Army veterans also accounted for 50 percent of the sample of veterans drawn from the NLS in the
Bryant and Wilhite (1990).
,2The reason the proportion of Army veterans in the RCS is less than the fraction of reserve manpower
in the Army reserve components is that the Naval Reserve and Air Force Reserve enlist a higher proportion
of prior service personnel (veterans) than the Army reserve components.
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III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A Effects of Veteran Status and Branch of Service
Despite numerous differences between the RCS and NLS, the results in Table 2 are
reasonably consistent with earlier studies based on the NLS: the return (in annual earnings)
to schooling and experience, and the effect of minority and marital status are very similar
to recent NLS wage studies (Low and Ormiston, 1991; Mangum and Ball, 1989). The
coefficients on the minority and marital status variables in the annual income equation are
nearly double their size in the weekly earnings equation. This difference may be traced to
differences in the annual work hours of married and nonwhite men.
The negative coefficient on the veteran status variable is consistent with Bryant and
Wilhite and Daymont and Andrisani, but conflicts with Mangum and Ball. The magnitude
of the coefficient, however, is small and just significant at the 7 percent level, two-tailed test.
On the basis of this regression, one would conclude that the difference between the earnings
of male veterans and non-veterans is slight. Futhermore, columns 2 and 3 in Table 2
analyze the effect of military service by branch and indicate that the negative effect of
military service is associated primarily with the Army. In contrast, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps veterans earn 2 to 4 percent more than their counterparts. 13 Again, the size
of these effects are larger in the annual earnings equation. The coefficients of the branch
variables reveal the average return to both the specific and general skills received in the
13Percentage effects are calculated from exp(/?)-1. These branch effects differ from Bryant and Wilhite
who found negative effects of military tenure for all branches (but positive wage effects for training received
in the Navy and Air Force).
11
service branches. Thus, it is plausible to interpret the observed positive effect of service in
the Navy and Air Force as attributable to the high proportion of technical specialities in
those branches, and the negative effect of Army service as due to its high proportion of
combat arms specialties. The training and skills required for Navy and Air Force
occupations may be more marketable, on the average, than the training received in the
Army. Yet, that argument does not explain the positive effect of a tour in the Marine
Corps, which is also dominated by combat-related specialties. An alternative explanation
for the success of Marine Corps veterans is that enlistment standards may be stricter (or
more strictly enforced) by the Marine Corps.
B. Occupational Transfer Effects
The impact of military training and the transfer of military skills to civilian jobs has
been a central issue in AVF-era studies. Studies have found that the ability to transfer
military skills to civilian employment is a major factor augmenting civilian earnings
(Mangum and Ball, 1989). This finding is not surprising: service leavers who transfer their
skills to the civilian sector change employers but not occupations; leavers who do not
transfer skills change both employers and occupations. It is worth noting that among young
civilian workers, occupational switching is nearly as common as employer switching. An
analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men found that, for each of several
two-year periods, 54 percent of the sample on average changed their 3-digit occupation code,
and 41 percent changed their 1-digit occupation (Shaw, 1984).
12
Those who change both employers and occupations lose both employer-specific
human capital as well as more general occupation-specific investments; as a consequence,
they often experience discontinuities in their income growth patterns. Shaw (1984)
demonstrates that investments in occupational skills have a much greater effect on earnings
than employer-specific skills acquired via firm tenure. This suggests that those who change
occupations during a job switch will experience a greater earnings disruption, at least in the
short-run, than those who maintain their occupation when switching employers. 14 Veterans
may be no different than civilians in this regard: leaving the military may simply be a part
of the pattern of job switching behavior exhibited by young civilian workers, with similar
effects. Any negative effects of veterans' shorter civilian job tenure are likely to be
outweighed by whether they transfer their occupation-specific investments: veterans who
transfer their occupational investments will fare better than those who do not.
In the present study, veterans are defined as having transferred their military
occupations if: (a) they respond on the RCS that their reserve and civilian jobs are "similar,"
and (b) their occupational specialty in the reserves is the same as it was in the active
military. This definition omits cases in which individuals transfer their military training to
a civilian job that differs from their active duty job, but which nonetheless utilizes some of
their military skills. These omissions are acceptable because they involve the transfer of
selected skills rather than of an entire occupation. However, the definition may also omit
some legitimate occupational transfers: namely, those in which reserve and military jobs
M
For other evidence on the impact of changing employers and occupations on wages see Kiker and
Roberts (1984).
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differ, but in which civilian and military jobs are the same. In those cases, the definition
understates the true amount of occupational transfer. Unfortunately, no information was
available in the RCS on the individual's active duty occupational specialty.
Of the veterans in the RCS, 12.3 percent transferred their military occupation to the
civilian sector. This compares to the roughly one-half of veterans who have responded on
surveys that military training helped qualify them for a civilian job, and the one-third of
veterans in the NLS with matching military and civilian occupations (Mangum and Ball,
1989). The occupational transfer rate in the RCS sample was the highest for the Navy (20.7
percent), followed by the Air Force (14.1 percent), Marine Corps (9.4 percent), and the
Army (8.8 percent). The low proportion of Army veterans who transfer military specialties
is not surprising since the Army reserve components, especially the National Guard, are
dominated by combat arms units, which enlist a high percentage of personnel with no prior
military service. The Naval Reserve, in contrast, enlists many prior service personnel
(veterans) with technical backgrounds.
The wage effects of occupational transfer are reported in Table 3. In column 1 the
coefficient ofTRANSFER indicates that occupational transfer yields a return of 5.1 percent,
a somewhat smaller premium than that estimated by Mangum and Ball. The coefficient of
veteran status, which now represents the independent effect of changing employers, is still
negative and significant, and indicates an immediate income loss of 2 percent upon exiting
the military.
14
The specification in Table 3 also includes the number of years since discharge
(YRSOUT) and its square (YRSOUT2) to measure one's post-military civilian experience.
When the years-since-discharge variable is included in the regression analysis, the partial
effect of veteran status becomes insignificant. This suggests that the small veterans earnings
penalty is associated with the lack of civilian job experience, rather than a direct result of
military service. Even so, the small penalty is offset rather quickly. Other things the same,
the earnings of veterans are 4.2 percent higher than nonveterans after only one year in the
civilian labor market and 9.2 percent higher after just two years. 15 Although the rise in the
earnings of veterans with time in the civilian labor market is at a decreasing rate, the rate
of decline is relatively slow. That the earnings growth of AVF veterans exceeds that of
nonveterans suggests that veterans may be more able, more work motivated, or receive more
general training in the military than is commonly believed. These attributes quickly offset
whatever earnings disadvantage they may encounter from having less knowledge of the
civilian job market, or from employers' inability to evaluate their military backgrounds. 16
In column 3 interaction terms between TRANSFER and branch of service are used
to evaluate the differential impact of occupational transferability across branches. The
coefficients of the interaction terms for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps indicate that
1!The partial effect of veteran status is calculated from: 3(ENGS)/3(VET) = -.01 + .053 (YRSOUT)
-.0009 (YRSOUT) 2 . The time pattern of veterans' earnings is almost identical to that observed by Mangum
and Ball who found that "within two years of their return to civilian life, those who served in the armed forces
enjoyed higher earnings than those who received training in the civilian sector. " (p. 244).
16The Department of Defense recently has begun to issue documents to veterans that verify their military
experience, training, and education in an effort to improve potential employers' knowledge of
veterans'military backgrounds (Navy Times
. 26 August 1991, p. 4).
15
the effectiveness of occupational transfer is between 10 and 13 percent for those branches.
In contrast, Army veterans who transfer occupations to the civilian sector earn about 7
percent less. Thus, the negative effect associated with Army-specific skills and training is
not mitigated by the ability of Army veterans to transfer their occupations to the civilian
sector. The coefficient of the Army-transfer interaction term in Table 3 has roughly the
same size as the Army dummy variable in Table 2. This relationship does not apply to the
other branch interactions and suggests that underreporting of occupational transfer may be
greater for Army veterans. It also suggests that the coefficient of the interaction term may
simply be picking up the negative return to Army-specific skills rather than the true return
to occupational transfer.
B. Differences in Veterans' Earnings by Race
The issue of minority representation in the armed forces is as heatedly debated today
as it was during the Vietnam War. In 1989, racial and ethnic minorities accounted for 29
percent of the enlisted force, roughly twice the percentage in the civilian population.
(OASD, 1990). Despite the importance of this issue, the differential impact of military
service for nonwhites has not been analyzed for AVF veterans. A traditional view has been
that for nonwhites the military is a more effective means to make the transition from school
to the civilian work force (the "bridging" hypothesis). To examine this hypothesis, Table 4
reestimates the annual income model separately for whites and nonwhites. Although not
strictly comparable to earlier studies that have examined veterans' earnings differences by
race, the results tend to be consistent with those studies.
16
Veteran status displays a dramatic difference in the income effect for whites and
nonwhites in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4; for whites, annual income is negatively and
significantly associated with veteran status, but for nonwhites veteran status has an
insignificant effect. In columns 3 and 4, both whites and nonwhites suffer an earnings
penalty from service in the Army, but only nonwhites reap the gains from service in the
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. In contrast, for whites the coefficients for the three
non-Army branches are statistically insignificant.
A Chow-test of differences in the regression coefficients between whites and
nonwhites rejected the null hypothesis of identical coefficients. 17 Thus, Tables 5 and 6
provide separate estimates of the effects of occupational transfer for nonwhites and whites.
The positive impact of occupational transfer found above in Table 3 appears to be confined
to white veterans. The coefficient of TRANSFER indicates that transferring occupations
generates a premium of 7.4 percent for white veterans, but displays no effect for nonwhites.
The largest effect occurs for white Navy veterans, who receive a premium of 14.1 percent.
Among nonwhites, income gains are observed only for Air Force veterans who transfer
skills. For both whites and nonwhites, Army veterans who transfer skills earn less. The
coefficient of the transfer-branch interaction term for Marine Corps veterans is insignificant
for both racial groups.
17The computed F-value of 2.01 exceeded the critical F-value (at the 1 percent level) of 1.79.
17
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study utilized the Reserve Components Survey of 1986, a unique source of
information on veterans and nonveterans, to analyze the post-service earnings impact of
military service for post-Vietnam, AVF-era enlistees. This data source has the distinct
advantage of controlling for some of the heterogeneity between veterans and nonveterans
that may have introduced biases in earlier studies. The second advantage of the RCS was
that it provided a large sample of veterans who had completed a short tour of military duty
before reentering civilian life.
The empirical results reveal a small earnings penalty associated with veteran status.
The earnings penalty is not unexpected since veterans are comparable to other young
civilian workers who switch employers and lose employer-specific training. This comparison
is less appropriate, however, if there are differences in occupational switching between the
two groups. If, for example, veterans are more likely to switch (i.e., less likely to transfer)
occupations when they change employers, they will be more likely to lose general human
capital and to suffer more serious income discontinuities compared to civilian job changers.
The observed earnings penalty, however, is short-lived; also, veterans reveal steeper earnings
growth than nonveterans. 18 On average, veterans catch up to their nonveteran counterparts
18
Willis and Rosen (1979) provide support for the hypothesis that people select themselves into observed
groups based on the principle of comparative advantage: they select the option with the largest expected
present value. Evidence to support this behavior in the present study is difficult to obtain due to the lack
of data to estimate the probit selection methods commonly used. Moreover, if we compare two options for
high school graduates -- college versus the military, say - then the correct test is to compare the earnings
of those who chose the military with what they would have recieved had they chosen college instead, and
to then compare this difference with what college attendees would have earned had they chosen the military
instead. The data for such a test are unavailable. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the military pay of
armed forces members during their first tour of duty often exceeds the entry-level pay of their civilian
18
within 1 to 2 years after exiting the military, although the required period is somewhat
longer for Army veterans.
The small post-military earnings penalty observed for veterans also masks significant
differences based on branch of service, extent of occupational transfer, and race. The
penalty is strongly associated with only one military branch - the Army. Service in the other
branches appears to augment post-service earnings capacities. Further, individuals who exit
the military but are able to transfer their military occupational specialty to the civilian sector
garnered a significant earnings premium over otherwise comparable nonveterans and other
veterans. In general, nonwhites appear to reap the largest benefit from military service,
especially from service in the Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. Despite significant
improvements in the civilian labor force status and earnings of minorities, the military still
appears to offer differential economic benefits to minority groups. However, white veterans
appear to benefit more than nonwhite veterans from occupational transfer. Among the
branches, the largest wage premium is earnged by white Navy veterans who are able to
transfer occupations to the civilian sector.
counterparts (or what the members themselves could have earned had they not entered the military). After
weighing the monetary value of veterans' benefits, such as the G.I. Bill, the present value of the military
option may far outweigh the alternatives.
19
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Table 1
Variable Names, Descriptions, and Means
Description
Means
Name Ml Veterans Non-
Veterans
WEEK Weekly earnings ($) 481 512 456
ANNUAL Annual income ($) 23 J17 25 ,712 22 ,110
EXP Years of potential
experience
15 .09 17.71 12.69
EXP2 EXP squared 307 .76 374.87 245.40
AGE Age in years 34 .16 37.05 31.80
NONWHITE = 1 if nonwhite .23 .26 .21
MARRIED = 1 if married .71 .78 .65
CHILD Number of dependents 1 .51 1.77 1.31
EDUC Years of education 13 .07 13.33 12.86
SELF = 1 if self-employed .04 .04 .04
VET = 1 if active duty
service
.44
ARMY = 1 if Army veteran .22 .49 --
NAVY = 1 if Navy veteran .09 .21 --
USAF = 1 if Air Force
veteran
.09 .20 --
USMC = 1 if Marine Corps
veteran
.04 .10 --
TRANSFER = 1 if skill
transfer
.07 .12 —
Sample Size 23 ,484 10 ,476 13 ,008
Table 2
Regression Estimates Explaining Log of Weekly
































































































adj. R2 .238 .240 .285 .288
No. Obs 23,466 23,466 25,986 25,986
aAbsolute t-statistics in parentheses; Industry and occupation dummy variables
omitted
Table 3
Effect of Skill Transfer




























^Absolute t-statistics in parentheses
Table 4
Regression Estimates for Whites and Nonwhites a
























































































adj. R2 .189 .323 .194 .324
No. Obs 6,423 19,618 6,423 19,618
'Absolute t-statistics in parentheses
Table 5



























'Absolute t-statistics in parentheses; sample size = 6,423
Table 6

























YRS0UT2 -- -- -.0004
(5.74)
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses; sample size = 19,618
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